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Dubois v. Greene
No. 97-21, 1998 WL 276282 (4th Cir. May 20, 1998)
I. Facts
Johnile L. Dubois ("Dubois") was sentenced to death after pleading guilty
to capital murder and other offenses related to the shooting of Philip C. Council
("Council").' One of three employees working at a convenience store on No-
vember 20, 1991, Council was shot in the chest once by Dubois who entered the
store with three accomplices. Dubois and the accomplices took approximately
$400 from the store's register and fled.2
After being indicted for capital murder and related charges, Dubois entered
into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth. Dubois agreed to plead guilty
to all crimes charged and to cooperate with the Commonwealth in its prosecu-
tion of Dubois's co-defendants in exchange for the Commonwealth's promise
not to seek the death penalty.3 Dubois's arraignment occurred on August 4,
1992. Dubois plead guilty to all charges, indicating that he understood the
possible consequences of a guilty plea.' Dubois reaffirmed his guilty plea follow-
ing the Commonwealth's summary of the evidence it would have presented at the
guilt phase of the trial. At this juncture, the court found that Dubois had know-
ingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered his guilty pleas and that the evidence
supported the pleas. At the end of the arraignment hearing, the court ordered
a pre-sentencing report.'
At the sentencing hearing, Dubois stated that he had read and compre-
hended the sentencing report. Dubois declined the court's invitation to question
the probation officer or to present any mitigating evidence. During arraignment,
Dubois's counsel asserted the inappropriateness of the death penalty due to the
lack of support in the record and the defendant's compliance with the plea agree-
ment, including -cooperation with the police. The Commonwealth, pursuant to
the plea agreement, did not ask the judge to impose the death penalty and did not
provide any showing of proof as to the aggravating factors, but instead urged the
court to impose the greatest sentence possible in accordance with the plea agree-
ment. Based on the record before it, the trial court sentenced Dubois to death.6
1. Dubois v. Greene, No. 97-21, 1998 WL 276282, at *1-2 (4th Cir. May 26, 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 25 (1998).
2. Dubois, 1998 WL 276282, at *1.
3. Id.
4. Id
5. Id at *2.
6. Dubois, 1998 WL 276282, at *2.
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari after the Supreme Court
of Virginia affirmed Dubois's conviction and sentence on direct appeal in
September, 1993. The Supreme Court of Virginia denied Dubois's state habeas
petition on March 15, 1996. On January 2, 1997, Dubois filed a federal habeas
petition which the district court dismissed on June 30, 1997. 7 Dubois appealed
to the Fourth Circuit.
II. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that most
of Dubois's claims were procedurally barred or defaulted via the rules established
in Slayton v. Parigan8 and Anderson v. Warden,9 respectively.0 In accordance with
the standard set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)," the court proceeded to Dubois's
state adjudicated claims, reviewing claims it had declared procedurally defaulted
and others not defaulted. The court failed to provide a rationale for all its rulings
on claims brought by Dubois, but stated that Dubois failed to establish a denial
of a constitutional right and therefore was not entitled to habeas relief. 2
II. Anaysis/Application in Virginia
A. The Guily Pka in Capital Cases
The Fourth Circuit, interpreting only Virginia law, held that the trial court
had the right to impose the death sentence even though Dubois entered into a
plea agreement with the government which stated that the government would
not ask for a death sentence. The Fourth Circuit stated that Dubois had not
cited to any United States Supreme Court cases or other precedent which contra-
7. Id at *1. After the Fourth Circuit denied relief, the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. Dubois, 119 S. Ct. at 25. Johnile L. Dubois was executed by the Commonwealth of
Virginia in August of 1998.
8. 205 S.E.2d. 680 (Va. 1974) (holding that a state habeas petitioner is prevented from
presenting claims that could have been, but were not, presented at trial or on direct appeal).
9. 281 S.E.2d. 885 (Va. 1991) (holding that a state habeas petitioner is prevented from
making contradictory assertions after establishing the adequacy of his court-appointed counsel and
the voluntariness of his guilty plea).
10. Dubois, 1998 WL 276282, at *5.
11. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. 1997). Sec-
tion 2254(d) states that any federal claim that was adjudicated in state court on the merits shall not
be reviewed at the federal level:
unless the adjudication of the claim - (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, dearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
I12
12. Dubois, 1998 WL 276282, at *7-11.
[Vol. 11: 1
19981 DUBOIS V GREENE
dicted or illustrated unreasonable application of the Supreme Court of Virginia's
holding.13
It is truly remarkable that nowhere in the appellate history of Duboisis there
discussion of the possible application of the United States Supreme Court holding
in Lankford v. Idaho.'4 The Fourth Circuit discussed the surprise death penalty
from many perspectives, but Lankford is missing. In Lankford, at all pertinent
times Idaho statutes provided notice that a trial judge could impose a death
sentence despite the prosecutor's unwillingness to recommend the death
penalty." Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court set aside the death
sentence because it found that with respect to sentencing, the adversarial process
had broken down. 6 Lankfordboils down to a due process lack of notice that the
death penalty was still an issue during the sentencing phase of the trial, leading
to a breakdown in the adversarial process. 7
In Dubois, the Fourth Circuit found that a questionable colloquy between
the judge and Dubois provided the notice of the court's authority to sentence
Dubois to death. The trial judge questioned Dubois in regard to Dubois's
13. Dubois, 1998 WL 276282, at *7. The court stated that such a showing of contradictory
precedent was required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA'). 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (Supp. 1997).
14. 500 U.S. 110 (1991) (holding that defendant's lack of notice that trial judge was consider-
ing death penalty lead to an impermissible breakdown of the adversarial process).
15. Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 118 (1991). Idaho Code section 19-2515 provides the
trial court with guidelines for fulfilling its responsibility of sentencing a defendant convicted of
capital murder. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1997). The statute states that the trial judge, upon a
finding of one of many possible aggravating factors, has the ability to impose the death sentence.
Id Idaho Code section 18-4004 states that "every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall
be punished by death or by imprisonment for life." IDAHO CODE § 18-4004 (1997). Section 19-
2515(G) states that "[ulpon making the prescribed findings, the court shall impose sentence within
the limits fixed by law." IDAHO CODE S 19-2515(G) (1997). Section 19-2515, in general, details
the limits fixed by law, giving the trial judge the discretion to make appropriate findings and
sentence the defendant. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1997).
16. Lankford, 500 U.S. at 127. The defense and the prosecution entered into a plea agreement
with the following conditions: the defendant would plead guilty in return for the government's
request for an indeterminate sentence with a ten year minimum, subject to the court's commitment
to this arrangement. The trial court refused to agree to the plea bargain terms, and the case went
to trial. After conviction, the government stated that it would not recommend the death penalty.
The trial court proceeded with all sentencing requirements, but never suggested the continuing
possibility of a death sentence. The defense did not prepare a case in mitigation relating to the
death penalty. At the sentencing hearing the prosecution offered no evidence and the defense
offered evidence with which it hoped to achieve the shortest imprisonment sentence possible. The
Supreme Court stated that, with respect to the death sentence, the adversarial process became
ineffective because neither party to the trial believed death was a consideration. Id Neither party
provided evidence supporting or contradicting the imposition of the death penalty. The court held
that this situation lead to an impermissible risk of error. Id A defendant's rights and interests
cannot be protected when there are reasonable indications that those interests and rights are not in
question. Lankford and counsel were not aware that the death penalty was being considered by the
trial court. They therefore did not prepare a defense in relation to this issue.
17. Id
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knowledge of the possible penalty associated with capital murder and also asked
if Dubois understood that he (the trial judge) could '"entence [Dubois] to a term
greater than [the prosecutor] may be recommending?"" This quote from the
guilty plea colloquy is ambiguous regarding the trial court's intention. The trial
judge asked Dubois if he knew what the maximum penalty for capital murder
was, which Dubois answered as the death penalty. But this line of questioning
is contradicted by the question quoted in the text above, which indicates that the
trial court would be sentencing Dubois to a "term," suggestive of a number of
years imprisonment, not the availability of the death penalty.
Inconsistent with the Fourth Circuit's finding of notice, there were many
indications that the adversary process had broken down at the sentencing phase
of Dubois's trial. 9 In addition to the ambiguous colloquy cited above, several
events occurring at the sentencing hearing suggest that the adversarial process
was no longer functioning. Dubois offered no mitigating evidence, nor did he
choose to question the findings of the probation officer who prepared the
sentencing report.' The Commonwealth provided no aggravating factor evi-
dence, but merely "urged the court to impose the maximum sentence possible
consistent with the agreement."2 These circumstances provide ample indicia of
a trial in which the adversaries no longer fulfilled their roles in providing either
the best defense possible or the active representation on behalf of the Common-
wealth in pursuing the greatest penalty.22
In any event, Dubois, and many other cases make it clear that under no
circumstances should a defendant be permitted to enter a plea of guilty to capital
murder without an express formal, or very strong informal, assurance from the
trial judge that the sentence will not be death.
B. Judicial Finding Aggravating Factor Necessary for Death Sentence Eligibility
Dubois's first claim centered around a denial of due process, citing the
Virginia court's lack of authority or power to impose the death penalty.23 In
question was the court's finding, based on the record, that one of the two
aggravating factors existed. Under Virginia law, these factors are identical to
elements of an offense with respect to authority to impose a death sentence.
18. Dubois, 1998 WL 276282, at *8 (emphasis added).
19. There are many possible reasons for an adversarial environment to break down. At
Dubois's trial the process broke down because the defense was not aware (lacked notice) that the
death penalty was being considered by the trial judge. The defense, therefore, did not present an
argument against imposition of the death sentence. This lack of awareness was also exhibited by
the prosecutor, who did not present any evidence in support of the death penalty.
20. Dubois, 1998 WL 276282, at *2.
21. Id
22. If the adversarial process had been intact, it would follow that Dubois might have at least
had a good claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney's lack of preparation and
presentation of any mitigating evidence.
23. Dubois, 1998 WL 276282, at *7.
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Unless one aggravating factor is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, a defendant
is not eligible for a death sentence. In accord with the plea agreement, the
Commonwealth made no offer of proof of either aggravating factor, vileness or
future dangerousness.
24
The actions of the trial judge directly contradicted the provisions of Vir-
ginia's capital sentencing law. Section 19.2-264.4 provides that "[t]he penalty of
death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable
doubt" one or both of the aggravating factors: future dangerousness or vileness.
25
If, in conjunction with a plea agreement, the Commonwealth offers no proof of
the aggravating factors, then the Commonwealth has failed to meet its burden of
proof and the requirements of Virginia state law are left unfulfilled.26
In addition to finding that this claim was defaulted because the precise claim
had not been raised in state court, itself an erroneous requirement, 7 the court
observed that Dubois had failed to cite any United States Supreme Court prece-
dent which the Supreme Court of Virginia had contradicted or applied unreason-
ably. One obvious United States Supreme Court precedent is a bedrock criminal
law case holding due process "protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged."2 Only after such a proof has been offered by
the Commonwealth may the trial court impose the death penalty. 9
Should future counsel be confronted with a similar circumstance, at the very
least counsel must move to withdraw the plea when the trial judge begins to
undertake the prosecutor's function, as happened in Dubois. This moment
occurred in Dubois when the trial judge began to recite the aggravating factors
that he had found present, even though the prosecution had not proffered any
evidence of aggravating factors.
24. Id
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Michic Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
26. Dubois, 1998 WL 276282, at *7.
27. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400,406 n. 9 (1988) (holding that a petitioner's due process
claim need not be asserted expressly as a Sixth Amendment violation in order for the issue to be
preserved for review by a federal court).
28. In re Wlinship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that every fact required to constitute a
finding of guilt in a criminal proceeding must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the
prosecution). See also Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) (holding that a capital defendant must
be guilty of a death penalty eligibility factor in order to be sentenced to death). These two cases
combined demonstrate the need for the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt an
aggravating circumstance required by Section 19.2-264.4(C) of the Virginia Code which makes the
defendant eligible for the death penalty. In Virginia, the aggravating factors required by the statute
are facts necessary to establish eligibility for death. A jury (or alternatively the judge if he is acting
as the trier of fact) must be presented with facts of the existence of an aggravating factor. It is also
important to remember that Dubois's plea of guilty only relieved the Commonwealth of its burden
to prove the offense of capital murder. He admitted nothing with respect to sentence.
29. Dubois, 1998 WL 276282, at *7.
1998]
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C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Dubois made over thirty independent ineffective assistance of counsel
claims relating to counsel's mishandling of the guilty plea arrangement and the
trial court sentencing process? ° The court considered only one of these ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claims, a claim made by Dubois that counsel failed to
advise him that under the plea agreement the death penalty could still be im-
posed." The court held the claim waived because Dubois had not presented it
earlier, but then continued to its merits, stating that Dubois had been fully
informed by counsel of the scope of the plea agreement. 2
The Fourth Circuit simply disregarded many of the other claims, stating
near the end of the opinion that Dubois improperly presented many of the
claims, apparently because he did not separately brief each of twenty five specific
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, it would appear necessary
in the future for counsel to brief and argue every instance of ineffective assis-
tance, in spite of the fact that they are to be measured individually and cumula-
tively, against the standards set out in only one case: Strickland v. Wasbington.
33
D. The Continuing Issue of Proportionaliy Review
One of Dubois's final arguments centered around Virginia's proportionality
review standard. Dubois argued that the Supreme Court of Virginia did not
provide meaningful proportionality review, in violation of his statutory right and
in violation of constitutional due process.' In addition to finding the issue
defaulted,3 the Fourth Circuit cited Pulley v. Harris36 which held that there is no
constitutional right to proportionality review. 3 The court further held that the
Virginia Supreme Court conducted a thorough and adequate proportionality
review in compliance with its procedures.
3 8
Pully held that the United States Constitution does not require proportion-
ality review, but it also states that appellate courts have an obligation to provide
meaningful appellate review.3 9 This claim should be presented in all capital cases
and should be raised as a facial challenge to all proportionality review in Virginia.
30. Id at *2-4.
31. Id at *10.
32. Id
33. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984) (providing the following two prong test
for finding ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) whether defendant received reasonable effective
assistance, and if not (2) whether a reasonable probability that the outcome would be different had
counsel's error no occurred).
34. Dubois, 1998 WL 276282, at *9. See a/so U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
35. Id at *6.
36. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
37. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 42-51 (1984).
38. Dubois, 1998 WL 276282, at *9.
39. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 54 (Stevens, J, concurring).
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Additionally, counsel should preserve the issue for federal review as an arbitrary
application of a state created right in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.' The Dubois court, at least, implicitly recognized the
existence of this federal ground.4
E. Conclusion
The court's discussion of Dubois's proportionality claim, including a finding
that it was defaulted because it was not raised at trial or on direct appeal, places
an unusual duty on defense counsel. It may also place a burden on the Virginia
courts, but that is not the concern of defense counsel. The Fourth Circuit
holding means:
1. Motions challenging systemic deficiencies in Virginia's proportionality
review are not premature when raised at the trial level.
2. Motions claiming that, if client is convicted and sentenced to death,
proportionality review by the Supreme Court of Virginia will be unconstitu-
tional, are not premature when raised at the trial level.
3. All challenges to proportionality review are to be renewed by petitions
for rehearing after the Supreme Court of Virginia conducts proportionality
review.
All of these actions are apparently necessary to avoid default. Defense counsel are
urged to give the Fourth Circuit what it wants.
Matthew Mahoney
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See Debbie Hill, Great Myths: Santa Claus, The Easter Bunny &
Viinia's Proportionait Review, CAP. DEF.J., vol. 10, no. 1, p. 33 (1997); Otto W. Konrad, How to
Look the Virginia Gift Horse in the Mouth: FederalDue Process and Viqrnia'sAritraryAbrogation of Capital
Defendant's State-Created Rights, CAP. DEF. DIG., vol 3, no. 2., p. 16 (1991).
41. Dubois, 1998 WL 276282, at *6.
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